Scholars have defined entrepreneurship as the process of transforming novel ideas into innovative fully scaled ventures. Yet, research has focused primarily on the beginning or end of this process without attending to the ?messy? middle, where innovations are developed but the market for them is not. The process of identifying a market for an innovation often requires on-going market search, feedback and iteration from a diverse village of stakeholders which can strain entrepreneurial firms' limited resources. How does the way entrepreneurial firms engage and learn from market search influence the process of new venture development? We examine how a cohort of 28 entrepreneurial firms in a digital health accelerator conducted and learned from market search. We identified the ways entrepreneurial firms engaged in the process of market search which included: search approach, search breadth and learning behaviors over time. We show how entrepreneurial firms' market search process varied in three ways (transactional, confirmatory and diagnostic) which produced different types of venture development progress. Firms that engaged in diagnostic search by pursuing joint-problem solving, searching broadly and leveraging ambiguous feedback were more likely to make progress as indicated by expansion of market scope and revenue than entrepreneurial firms that engaged in either confirmatory or transactional search. Drawing on theories of search and learning, we contribute a grounded theoretical explanation of how entrepreneurial firms' learn from search and advance new venture development.
1
Entrepreneurship is often defined as the process of converting novel ideas into fully scaled ventures (Eckhardt & Shane, 2003) , but research has focused primarily on the beginning or end of this process to the neglect of the transformation that occurs in the middle. Extant literature explains why some early-stage entrepreneurial firms are more apt to recognize opportunities and generate novel innovations than others, typically based on the attributes or experience of founders (Sorensen and Audia, 2000; Grimes, 2018; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1990 and Shane, 2000 , 2003 . Founder cognition, prior experience, and preferences for taking risk can all help explain whether an entrepreneurial firm identifies an opportunity (Burton, Sorensen & Beckman 2002; Sorensen & Sorensen, 2003; Baron, 2008; Kihlstrom & Laffont, 1979; Shane 2003) ; acquires early stage resources (Hallen, 2008; Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012) and, based on these pre-entry characteristics, exits (Chen, Croson, Elfenbein & Posen, 2018) . On the other hand, scholars have shown how the adaptations mature entrepreneurial firms make in response to shifts in their environment predict venture outcomes (Van de Ven & Poole, 1994; Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Aldrich & Ruef, 2006; Bingham & Davis, 2013) . For example, Marx & Hsu (2015) argue that the late stage adjustments made by bio-tech firm Swanson to shift commercialization strategies from a cooperative strategy to a competitive strategy was critical to their survival and ultimate
performance.
Yet, little attention has been paid to the "messy" middle, where entrepreneurial firms have developed innovations but not a market for them. Scholars have recently theorized that entrepreneurs engage in market search to expand the market for their innovations and "gain traction" (Pontikes & Barnett, 2017) . However little research considers the process by which entrepreneurial firms engage in market search. We define market search as information gathering activities that probe whether an innovation can be successfully adapted or expanded to meet the need of a specific market. " [M] arket search does not mean entrepreneurs discard what they have and start anew. Rather, they build on their past developments, using existing products, technologies, or market insights as a starting point to search for a market category in which the firm can gain traction" (Pontikes and Barnett, 2017: 143) . We posit that market search differs from opportunity identification, when entrepreneurial firms search for ideas and the cost of experimentation is low (e.g., Stern, Gans, & Wu, 2017; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995) .
Unlike the early stages of innovation search when innovators are generating novel ideas (e.g. Hargadon & Sutton, 1997) , market search occurs after an innovation is developed. During market search, an entrepreneurial firm strives to learn about the context in which their innovation will be used to fit their innovation with a particular market (e.g. Pontikes & Barnett, 2017) . Only by doing so, can entrepreneurial firms transform a technically viable concept in to a financially feasible commercial venture (Dorf & Byers, 2008) .
While scholars have examined how entrepreneurial firms acquire resources from investors (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Hallen, 2008) , identifying a market for a new innovation often involves sussing out the demand preferences of a broad set of customers, suppliers, regulators and potential partners (e.g. Pinch and Bijker, 1987) . While symbolic interactions with investors can help entrepreneurial firms acquire early resources (Zott & Huy, 2007) , to conduct market search, entrepreneurial firms must engage deeply with external stakeholders through a dynamic, on-going process to unearth how their innovation might integrate with established institutions (Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001) or industry value chains (Adner & Kapoor, 2010) . For example, although Edison knew that the electric lightbulb could work in his lab, he needed to convince key stakeholders in the competing gas industry to engage with him to adapt the lightbulb to fit with existing institutions (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001) . While Edison could test the technical feasibility of his innovation in the laboratory, the economic viability of that innovation could only be ascertained in the market where diverse stakeholders helped to identify the adaptations needed to generate adoption. Although it is well known that entrepreneurial firms often require the support of investors (Lerner, 2009 ) and family and friends (Dahl and Sorensen, 2010; Sorensen, 2018) , the ongoing and dynamic process by which entrepreneurial firms engage with external stakeholders such as partners, suppliers and customers to inform the integration work (e.g. Long-Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010; Carlile, 2004; Burt, 2004) needed to facilitate adoption and diffusion is less appreciated.
Entrepreneurial firms engage in market search to learn how their innovations will align with external stakeholders, anticipating the need for revision, iteration and change to their innovations (e.g. Marx and Hsu, 2015) to achieve integration with established systems. How entrepreneurial firms engage and learn from market search is important to understand, especially because adapting innovations to integrate with a particular market can be costly and entrepreneurial firms at this stage may lack a depth of resources to engage in long cycles of iteration. The scholarly literature on search often examines search sources and breadth (Ahuja & Katila, 2002 , Dalhander, O'Mahony & Gann, 2012 Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010; Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015) , yet neglects to appreciate the process by which firms learn from the information gained from search. We argue that both aspects of market search are important -how entrepreneurial firms conduct search as well as how they learn from the information sourced. Without examining both the process of search and how entrepreneurial firms learn from search, we cannot distinguish effective search strategies from a capacity to learn and adapt. Such conflation may muddy our understanding of how entrepreneurial firms develop their ventures.
How does the way entrepreneurial firms engage and learn from market search influence the process of new venture development?
This research investigates how entrepreneurial firms engage and learn from market search to advance their digital health innovations in a common institutional field with a process based approach.
With field data collected through a 15-month ethnographic study of 28 entrepreneurial firms, we contribute a grounded process theory of market search. We found that entrepreneurial firms with common objectives and access to a common set of external stakeholders varied in the way they enacted market search by differing their approaches to search and their learning behaviors, which had implications for the type of venture development progress they achieved. We could not explain this variation based on an entrepreneurial firm's sub-sector, founder experience or gender, funds raised, revenue generated or clients targeted. Rather, we identified three different ways entrepreneurial firms enacted the process of market search: Transactional, Confirmatory and Diagnostic. Entrepreneurial firms that pursued transactional, narrow search and prioritized concrete feedback developed their customer pipeline, but without learning of new market requirements, did not expand their market scope or grow revenue. Entrepreneurial firms that engaged in confirmatory search sought validation, but did not learn from ambiguous feedback and narrowly reframed their market scope without growing revenue.
Entrepreneurial firms that engaged in diagnostic search and assumed an approach of joint problem solving were more likely to learn from ambiguity and grow new sources of revenue. By attending to variation in entrepreneurial firms' market search and learning behavior, we illuminate the hidden costs market search can pose as well as the mechanisms that can help entrepreneurial firms surmount these costs. Drawing on dimensions of search and learning behavior, we contribute a grounded process model of how entrepreneurial firms construct and draw upon different villages and vary in how they learn from market search.
MARKET SEARCH AND ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRM LEARNING
A large literature on innovation search suggests that increased exposure to broad or diverse sources of information will confer a "vision advantage" (Burt, 2004 ) and likely offer unique or nonredundant information (Granovetter, 1983) . The "variance hypothesis" (Dahlander, O'Mahony and Gann, 2016) suggests that the breadth of innovation search is highly associated with generating novel ideas at the level of the individual, group and firm (Fleming, 2001; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Leiponen and Helfat, 2011) . Thus, entrepreneurial firms benefit from drawing upon a broad set of external stakeholders to inform the generation of novel ideas and development of their innovations (Cohen et al, 2018 ). Yet once entrepreneurial firms have sourced or generated a novel idea and developed their innovations, they face a new challenge: how to gain market traction. This initiates a different type of search, market search. The concept of market search was only recently defined by Pontikes and Barnett (2017) , as the actions entrepreneurial firms take to search externally to fit their innovation with a particular market. Building on this definition, we posit that market search is an ongoing and dynamic process which differs from the search for new ideas in important ways.
First, extant scholarship suggests that broad search fosters idea generation in the early stages of the innovation process where divergent thinking is desired, but can hamper the development of ideas in the later stages, where convergent thinking and collaboration with a few stakeholders enables progress (Fleming, Mingo and Chen, 2007; Obstfeld, 2005; Long-Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010) . The thinking is that once an innovation is generated, then need for search dissipates as refinement and implementation of that idea benefits from cohesive collaborations that foster trust (Fleming, Mingo and Chen, 2007; Obstfeld, 2005) . This suggests that entrepreneurial firms conducting market search may benefit from searching narrowly, relying on a few strong ties (Hansen, 1999) ; or very specific groups of stakeholders (Jawahar & Mclaughlin, 2001 ) to inform later stages of new venture development. While this may be true for discrete innovations that need to be shepherded through a structured, stable process within a large firm, innovations that require integration with complex or dynamic systems may benefit from on-going broad market search to assure the relevance of their innovations. As Carlile and Rebentisch (2003) explain, the integration of innovations into established systems requires modification to achieve true interdependence and synthesis.
Second, market search differs from the search for ideas in the type of learning goals sought out as the product of search. Rather than search for novel ideas to inform new concept development, when entrepreneurial firms engage in market search, they seek to learn about the existing social, political and economic barriers to integrating new innovations that may challenge their plans for market expansion.
For example, Adner (2017) shows how new innovations such as the PAX run-flat tire failed to gain traction as Michelin neglected to learn the needs of critical stakeholders in the value chain and integrate those needs into product strategy. When entrepreneurial firms attempt to gain new customers in established market segments, they may find that customers have different appetites for risk. There may be reticence to adopt a product that appears too novel (Bingham & Kahl, 2013) , too complex to integrate into existing systems (Moore, 1991) or that lacks needed complements (Adner & Kapur, 2010) . New customers may have an appetite for novelty, but impose different technical requirements that can strain an entrepreneurial firm's focus and identity (Zott & Amit, 2008; Grimes, 2018) . When there is a need to integrate or synthesize with a complex existing system of suppliers, customers, regulators, such as is the case with the field of digital health (Mintzberg, 2017) , learning about stakeholder needs is a critical antecedent to adoption. Under these circumstances, entrepreneurial firms engage in market search not to source new ideas but, with the goal of understanding how to adapt their innovations to integrate with customer environments.
Yet, the process of market search takes time and effort as in some cases entrepreneurial firms may not have the capacity to conduct comprehensive search (Ocasio, 1997; Ahuja & Katila, 2002; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) . Entrepreneurial firms often lack the internal differentiation needed to balance market exploration with the needs to keep the lights on (March, 1991) . Entrepreneurial firms attempting to bring novel concepts to market often struggle with attending to all facets of venture development, while engaging with critical stakeholders like investors, customers, suppliers and partners. In mature or established firms, the tasks associated with market search can be allocated to discrete internal divisions (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Gupta, Smith, Shalley, 2006) . Firms like IBM employ hundreds of innovators dedicated to external search (Dahlander et al, 2016) , but entrepreneurial firms have a limited set of resources to draw upon and may prematurely bound their search (Cohen et al, 2018) . Moreover, sourcing external feedback through market search is not a cost-free exchange. Entrepreneurial firms must dedicate time to crafting strategic narratives (Navis and Glynn, 2001 ) to explain their innovations to disparate audiences with limited ability to understand the underlying idea (e.g. Carlile, 2004) . While a few scholars have begun to examine both the benefits and costs associated with search (Piezunka and Dahlander, 2015) , less research considers how the products of search are acted upon to inform how entrepreneurial firms advance entrepreneurial ventures.
We argue that the way entrepreneurial firms respond to and learn from the feedback sourced through search may be critical to the entrepreneurial venture development process. Even when market search is comprehensive, it may not lead to cogent, coherent prescriptions on how to advance an entrepreneurial innovation (e.g., Gaba & Joseph, 2016) . This creates space for diverse interpretations and actions and thus the potential for variance in the way entrepreneurial firms learn from search.
Edmondson characterizes learning behaviors as an ongoing process of reflection and action where "team members test assumptions and discuss differences " (1999: 353) . Scholars tend to examine learning behaviors from two vantages: either the sources of information people seek to learn from (Cohen et al, 2018; Bingham & Davis, 2012; Bunderson & Reagans 2012; Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Schwab, 2007; Miner, Bassoff, Moorman, 2001) or how groups or individuals process new information to influence performance over time (Deichmann & van de Ende 2014; Gaba & Joseph, 2016; Rerup, 2009; Edmondson, 1999; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992) . For example, scholarship on the sources of learning has shown that while some entrepreneurial firms prefer to first learn directly from their own experiences, others prefer to learn indirectly or vicariously by observing others before embarking on activities that would foster direct learning (Bingham and Davis, 2012) . Scholars focused on processing new information examine how embracing failure and learning from feedback affects a group's ability to master new tasks (Edmondson, Dillon, Roloff, 2007 , Dweck, 2008 ; adopt new innovations (Deichmann & Ende, 2014; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992) and perform (Edmondson, 1999; Edmondson, 2002) . While learning scholars have examined the individual, team and firm-level antecedents to effective learning behaviors (Edmondson, 2002; Schwab, 2007; Bunderson & Reagans, 2011; Anderson & Lewis, 2013; Van de Ven and Polley, 1992; Edmondson, Dillon & Roloff, 2007) , little research considers how approaches to searching for feedback can constrain or enable different learning behaviors. For example, when firms limit potential sources for search to only strong ties, or a particular type of stakeholder group, such as investors, they may constrain the types of feedback received which can inhibit learning. Thus, an entrepreneurial firm's ability to learn may not only be a function of their learning behaviors, but also of their approach to search. What is needed is research that unpacks they process by which entrepreneurial firms approach external search and how they learn from the information gained from search to inform venture evolution over time.
Methods
This paper draws from over 15-months of field data collected while the first author was embedded within a digital health accelerator -Alpha (pseudonym). The period of study includes the two month vetting period prior to entry; the six months entrepreneurial firms engaged in the Alpha program; and the seven months following -for a total of 15 months. We conducted comparative analysis of all 28 entrepreneurial firms that matriculated through Alpha as part of the 2017 cohort to understand how entrepreneurial firms engaged with and learned from market search during the six-month program and in the months that followed program completion.
Research Setting. The field of digital health is often defined as the interface of healthcare and technology and includes technologies which support: medical administration, care delivery, prevention, medical diagnosis, patient education and wellness (Mintzberg, 2018) . Digital health can be considered a field formed around a challenge critical to stakeholders such as hospitals, insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, government agencies and technology companies to improve patient care and reduce the cost of care (e.g. Hoffman, 1999) . Entrepreneurs innovating in digital health face similar challenges to those innovating in energy, financial services (Venkatraman, 2017) and other institutionally complex industries (Zeistma et al, 2017) . For example, innovating in digital health often requires mustering sizable commitments from external parties to overcome significant institutional complexity brought about by regulatory hurdles, sales pathways mediated by insurers and a lack of common standards, metrics and norms (Stern, 2017; Herzlinger, 2005) . Further, since innovating in one area of health often impacts other aspects of the healthcare system, entrepreneurs often rely on information from external parties to develop a comprehensive understanding of how their innovations can be integrated into existing systems (Mintzberg, 2018) .
Alpha was founded in 2016 to convene a set of external stakeholders such as experts, investors, partners, and customers to help entrepreneurial firms address these challenges. Many accelerators focus on improving outcomes for early-stage, pre-seed entrepreneurs looking to develop their ideas into viable products (Cohen, 2014) . Rather than admit entrepreneurs at this early stage, Alpha only accepts entrepreneurial firms with viable products looking to gain market traction by acquiring more customers.
By selecting Alpha as a field-setting, we can examine how entrepreneurial firms engaged in market search as opposed to how they search for ideas to conceive of entrepreneurial opportunities, which has been much examined (Shane, 2000; Shane and Stuart, 2002) . As a medical device executive shared, "They are real teams, with real businesses, with existing ideas, looking to get things done" Upon entry into the program, the average admitted firm was 2.75 years old, generated approximately $250,000 in revenue, and had raised $1,220,000 in funding.
Sample Selection. To gain admittance to Alpha's 6-month program, 230 entrepreneurial firms submitted applications for evaluation to a set of randomly assigned judges with health expertise.
Entrepreneurial firms had to fit venture maturity criteria which required a working product, some evidence of customer acquisition, but limited the cohort to firms that had not yet received series B funding. Of the 230, 60 applicants were invited to live pitch for additional judges. Ultimately 28 entrepreneurial firms, almost half of the firms that live pitched, matriculated through the program. None of the entrepreneurial firms asked to the join the program declined. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the Alpha program from initial judging to final pitching and awards.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Most entrepreneurial firms were under 5 years of age when they started the Alpha program, with one exception, QUICKD which had been in existence for 8 years. All 28 firms had either raised funding or generated revenue at program entry and shared a common market search objective: to grow the market for the innovations they had developed.
INSERT TABLE 1
Data Collection. To understand how entrepreneurial firms engaged in the process of market search, we collected three kinds of field data: observations, interviews, and entrepreneurial firm data. The goal was to observe participants' interactions at the accelerator and their venture development activities to understand how the process of market search unfolded over time (Emerson et al. 1995) . To triangulate data and construct validity (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) , we drew from ethnographic field observations, 103 structured and unstructured interviews, and entrepreneurial firm data reflecting firm progress during the program. Following completion of the program, we continued ethnographic observations and conducted on-going interviews with 10 different entrepreneurial firms, selected to represent different sub-sectors, culminating in a 15 month study. Figure 2 summarizes the data collected over the 15 months of study, from 2016-2018.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Observations. Observations began by working in the accelerator space one to two days per week, as noted by Bechky "building rapport was not an instantaneous process " (2003: 316) . However, as time progressed, we became a trusted "member of the accelerator team" and were invited to observe all status meetings, many planning and strategy sessions, team brainstorms, post-mortems and even late night debrief sessions. Observations also occurred at numerous public events hosted by the accelerator. These sessions provided excellent opportunities to observe how entrepreneurial firms engaged with other members of their cohort, Alpha staff and external stakeholders such as digital health industry experts, customers, mentors, and investors.
Interviews. We conducted interviews with founders or CEOs from the cohort of each 28 entrepreneurial firms matriculating through Alpha. Many firms were interviewed multiple times during the period of study, with different members of the founding team when possible. We formally interviewed all members of the accelerator staff twice and also interviewed 13 customers. These interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 2 hours each. At the end of the program, we conducted entrepreneurial firm interviews with a trained research associate, drawing from a structured protocol to understand how each entrepreneurial firm leveraged feedback to develop their ventures. In sum, 103 interviews were conducted: 10 interviews with Alpha staff, 80 interviews with entrepreneurial firm founders and 13 interviews with potential customers that engaged with the entrepreneurial firms we studied.
Entrepreneurial Firm Data. Every firm completed an application form detailing their value
proposition and target customer market, among other firm vitals, at both entry and exit to the program, coupled with external evaluations at both entry and exit, which provided a valuable understanding of firms' starting and ending points. We collected this data for every entrepreneurial firm along with strategy presentations, goals, milestones, blogs, and press releases created during the six month program.
Data Analysis. Contrary to extant research, early signals of entrepreneurial quality (Ewens, Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2018; Guzman & Stern 2015) did not predict which firms made more progress.
We could not identify a relationship between the quality of an entrepreneurial firm upon entry (e.g., in terms of funding and revenue acquired) and the types progress firms made by the end of the program.
Because this observation was counter-intuitive, we engaged in open coding to understand the practices entrepreneurial firms used to engage in market search. So, you want to confirm those ideas." Entrepreneurial firms seeking joint-problem solving sought to surface domain specific issues associated with implementing their innovations with a given external stakeholder.
For example, when QUICKD organized a series of meetings with a pharmaceutical company to jointly explore how their technology might be repurposed for new diagnostic uses, we coded it as joint-problemsolving.
Second, we learned that entrepreneurial firms did not seek interactions with the same types of external stakeholders, but differed in their search breadth. For example, while some entrepreneurs sourced expertise from other cohort members, other members did not reach out to acquire information, feedback and advice from others. "They held their cards close" as shared by NUDGE, a behavioral support company. Thus, we coded which types of external stakeholders entrepreneurial firm interacted with: Alpha staff, customers, peers or subject matter experts to determine entrepreneurs' search breadth.
Third, engagement in market search usually surfaced feedback which we defined as information shared by external stakeholders with implications for entrepreneurs' venture development. Feedback could include either opportunities or problems (e.g. Kirtley & O'Mahony, 2018) , but this distinction did not affect how feedback was analyzed. As suggested by Perry-Smith & Mannucci (2018), we coded for the valence of feedback (positive or negative) but did not identify any discernible pattern. External stakeholders tended to provide two types of feedback: concrete feedback that clearly specified issues with discrete areas of a venture and offered a prescribed solution or ambiguous feedback that was difficult to disentangle or interpret with no clear prescribed solution (e.g. Daft & Weick, 1984) . For example, when an insurance firm advised MDCOR that they had to change aspects of how their data was modeled to comply with their privacy rules, we coded this as a concrete issue. The insurance firm raised a clear, discrete issue that MDCOR understood they would need to revise in their technical product to ink a deal.
In contrast, when a mentor to NUDGE commented that NUDGE's user-interface "fell-flat", and he did not articulate how it underwhelmed him, nor how to fix it, we coded this as an ambiguous issue.
Phase 2: Learning from Feedback. Rather than face a scarcity of feedback, many of the entrepreneurial firms we studied were overwhelmed by an abundance of feedback coming from multiple directions. Thus, we turned to theories of learning behavior (Edmondson, 1999) , that suggest the activities firms engage in to process new information are important to their performance. We examined how entrepreneurial firms learned or neglected to learn from feedback raised by external stakeholders and noticed that some entrepreneurial firms focused on concrete feedback, whereas others prioritized ambiguous feedback, even if it did not initially make sense to them.
We then identified nine different practices entrepreneurial firms used when making sense of external feedback: Minimizing, Deflecting, Acquiescing, Recognizing, Reframing, Taming, Translating, Identifying new possibilities and Redirecting. When entrepreneurial firms discounted feedback, by comparing it to inconsequential prior experiences and failing to learn from it, we coded this as Minimizing.
Entrepreneurial firms Deflected feedback when they verbally pushed back against feedback by citing an opposing opinion. When entrepreneurial firms Acquiesced, they adapted to feedback and revised their products, despite acknowledging that doing so might not improve their venture. When Recognizing feedback, entrepreneurial firms tried to learn from the feedback they received and applied information sourced from other external stakeholders to make sense of the new feedback. Entrepreneurial firms engaged in Reframing when they attempted recast the assumptions underlying a venture use-case without making product revisions. Entrepreneurial firms Tamed ambiguity when they converted ambiguous feedback into a familiar lens to help others learn (e.g. Bingham & Kahl, 2013; Carlile, 2004 Phase 3: Clustering Learning Behaviors. After identifying the nine practices used to address external feedback, we coded which firms utilized which practices during the time of study. We noticed distinct patterns in learning behaviors: firms that tended to minimize or deflect feedback also acquiesced to feedback, but did not tame, reframe or redirect. We then crossed learning behaviors by search approach.
Entrepreneurial firms seeking exchange were likely to minimize, deflect and acquiesce to feedback.
Entrepreneurial firms seeking validation were likely to recognize concrete feedback and reframe their market assumptions, but neglect ambiguous feedback. Entrepreneurial firms seeking joint problem solving received and attended to both concrete and ambiguous feedback but were likely to tame ambiguity, translate feedback, identify new possibilities and redirect learning.
Phase 4: Identifying the Process of Market Search. After identifying how entrepreneurial firms' learning behaviors differed, we constructed the process by which entrepreneurial firms conducted market search.
Following Locke, Golden-Biddle and Feldman (2008), we mapped three dimensions of market search (approach, breadth and the type of feedback received) with two dimensions of learning behavior (prioritization of feedback and practices) for all 28 entrepreneurial firms to identify three different search processes (transactional, confirmatory and diagonistic).
Phase 5: Assessing Venture Development Progress. We noticed that firms advanced differently in making three types of venture development progress: (1) building a pipeline of customers; (2a) narrowing market scope; (2b) expanding market scope; and (3) growing new sources of revenue. When entrepreneurial firms developed a customer pipeline, they expanded their business network to include new customers and potential partners. As expressed by Amabile and Pratt (2016) , progress need not only be expansive, but can also be reductive. Entrepreneurial firms made progress on defining their market scope in two ways: either narrowing market scope or expanding it. When entrepreneurial firms narrowed market scope, they updated their assumptions, becoming more precise about their market relevancy and narrowed their venture use-cases. When entrepreneurial firms expanded market scope, they identified new market segments relevant for their innovation and added venture use-cases. Growing new sources of revenue involved actually closing a deal with a revenue bearing customer. These types of progress were accumulative such that growing new revenue would be difficult to accomplish without building a customer pipeline and expanding market scope.
Phase 6: Building a Grounded Theoretical Model of Market Search.
To understand why not all entrepreneurial firms made equal progress in all areas of venture development, we revisited our data to assess the relationship between market search and venture development progress. We did this analysis two ways. First, we compared all firms along dimensions of search (approach, breadth and feedback received) and two dimensions of learning behavior (prioritization of feedback and practices). We moved back and forth between firm level data and comparative tables to trace how the data aligned with venture development progress. This analysis reconfirmed the firms that engaged in transactional, confirmatory and diagnostic search. Second, working from the process model, we analyzed commonalities and differences to identify the mechanisms that produced different types of progress. Analyses at the firm, construct and process level helped generate a grounded theory of market search that help explain variation in how firms make progress on new venture development.
HOW ENTEREPRENEURIAL FIRMS LEARN FROM MARKET SEARCH
To better understand the messy middle, where entrepreneurial firms transform viable innovations into commercial ventures, we explored how entrepreneurial firms in a common setting learned from market search. Tables 2a, b and c provide illustrative data in a common sub-sector (virtual reality) for purposes of comparison. After explaining how entrepreneurial firms varied in the way they conducted market search, we offer a grounded explanation of how the process of market search shaped new venture development.
Transactional Search. Nine out of 28 entrepreneurial firms in the cohort engaged primarily in transactional search, seeking exchange solely with customers to source new contracts and conduct deal making. These nine entrepreneurial firms spanned all sub-sectors of digital health and varied by firm founding date, funds raised and revenue generated at program entry.
Entrepreneurial firms pursuing transactional search were unabashedly instrumental and focused primarily on acquiring information to accelerate deal making. This focused approach helped accelerate the initiation of customer deals by over a month compared with other firms in the cohort. Yet, by the end of the study, entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search had developed their customer pipeline without closing deals: these firms also did not expand their market scope or grow new sources of revenue. Table 2a illustrates how CAREVR, a firm using virtual reality to monitor and educate patients' physical therapy engaged in and learned from market search.
INSERT TABLE 2a
Market Search. When entrepreneurial firms conducted transactional search, they queried only promising customers to discover when they could demo their innovations; if NDA's (non-disclosure agreements) were necessary to initiate the deal-making process; and who needed to sign an MOU (memorandum of understanding). The questions that drove search were focused narrowly on understanding the landscape of exchange rather than on the substance of validating their innovations in other environments. For example, CORDCAR, a firm focused on building technology to coordinate acute in-patient care across different clinical personnel, carefully selected which Alpha events to attend based on the likelihood of gaining information on prospective deal making and was explicit in explaining their intentions: "We don't go to these events to learn about the industry. We go to get deal intel". At one such event, we observed the CEO of CORDCAR nonchalantly walking the event floor. Yet, prior to the event, we found him in the Alpha office feverishly practicing how to source budgetary information from select event-attendees and how to disengage from "less productive conversations". We noticed him put this technique to work when he feigned an important call from his wife to avoid a conversation when it stopped yielding transactional information.
Firms engaged in transactional search mainly narrowed their search breadth and sourced information from customers without seeking advice from their cohort, Alpha or the experts Alpha convened to mentor the cohort. PACK, a company that created customer pharmaceutical pill packs purposefully focused on targeted customers and avoided interacting with either their cohort or other stakeholders. Tom, a founder of PACK, shared why:
[At Alpha] there is an amazing collection or wellspring of resources for entrepreneurs, more than anyone could ever take advantage of. And we navigate carefully. We selectively neglected our peers and the [Alpha] staff to focus on engaging with people from organizations who can make deals. You have to make it [making deals] your total focus and filter everything else out.
Despite acknowledging the abundance of expertise at Alpha, Tom believed that seeking advice from the village Alpha had carefully constructed could take his team off track. Another founder from PACK viewed the information sourced from peers and Alpha staff as not just inefficient, but potentially dangerous: "You can't find out how best to approach a given customer by asking other startups. They don't really understand what you are doing so, they might give bad advice." Entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search considered information sourced from peers and experts as potentially suspect or incorrect. As stated by PACK, "You have to triple check everything you get from a startup.
Even if there is no ill intent."
Learning Behavior. Entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search were not interested in learning from people they did not think capable of signing deals and thus did not learn about the broader context shaping their customers' environment. They searched more narrowly and did not receive ambiguous feedback like entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory or diagnostic search. The feedback customers tended to provide in response to transactional search was mainly concrete and detailed specific changes required to work with them rather than shed light on their broader challenges. A hospital executive reflected on their exchange with CORDCAR:
They came to us in a very specific way. To sign a contract for a paid pilot which we could convert to a full contract. We had some very specific things they had to do to run a pilot with us, and of course they needed to figure out how it aligned with our strategic priorities, which we were clear about. They were going to have to change their product around to meet those priorities.
However, the custom changes this CEO asked for conflicted with CORDCAR's current product in use at several other customer sites. Adapting to the changes the CEO requested would make the creation of a single integrated product difficult to produce. Concrete feedback like this was a double edged sword for entrepreneurial firms like CORDCAR: it provided a very clear map of what was required for a particular customer, but it did not help CORDCAR integrate competing demands to serve the larger market.
As shown in Table 2a , entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search enacted three learning behaviors when processing the feedback from search: minimizing feedback, deflecting feedback, and acquiescing to feedback. When transactional searchers minimized feedback, they compared the feedback received from search to prior search experiences to minimize the importance of the feedback and avoid making changes to their innovation. For example, when MDCOR, a firm developing care coordination software for patients with co-morbidities (e.g. cancer and diabetes), first received feedback from an insurer that they needed to automatically capture and track "three more data points", they were dismayed as they would not only have to pay to acquire the requested data points, but also redeploy resources from other projects to revise their software. When a hospital had raised the same point earlier, MDCOR had effectively minimized this feedback by arguing that it would be costly for the hospital to maintain these data and had successfully dissuaded the hospital from insisting on this request. When MDCOR heard this same issue repeated from an insurer, they applied the same response used earlier, but this time minimizing was not effective and the insurer persisted in requesting the data.
When transactional searchers deflected feedback, they advanced arguments to contradict feedback and convince the other party to drop the request for changes to their innovation. When minimizing feedback failed with the insurer, MDCOR argued that the insurer's request for three more data points was "customized, specialized, one-off" and argued that other insurers would not require these adjustments.
However, MDCOR had not searched broadly to learn if that was true. "They basically called us on our bull-shit. We didn't really know [if what they were asking for was standard]. They had views on what was required. And they were not going to help us get this work done at all. They will say that is absolutely our problem." After minimizing and deflecting feedback to no avail, and still eager to close a deal, MDCOR acquiesced to the insurer's feedback and pulled three full-time people off a separate project to revise the technical functionality of their product and add the three requested data points. "At first, we thought, we could get it done quick. But no. not at all." Iteration led to more iteration with no financial commitment from the insurer: "I don't know if anyone else got revenue generating agreements while at Alpha, we invested 6 months of work, and did tons of iterations to our product, but we didn't get paid." Even after revising their product, MDCOR could not convince the insurance company to commit to a deal during the time of study. Transactional searchers like MDCOR became caught in a "custom trap" iterating on technical features in the hope of signing customer deals in advance of a revenue guarantee.
Like CORDCAR, MDCOR provides a good example of transactional search. These firms made a deliberate choice not to engage in the complexity of market search, even though they confronted competing requirements from different customer segments such as hospitals and insurers. They searched narrowly and sought exchange with only targeted customers to the neglect of their cohort and other stakeholders. This focused approach surfaced concrete feedback which triggered iteration and revision but limited entrepreneurial firms' ability to learn about the broader requirements of diverse set of stakeholders. Without gleaning more information about the broader contexts they sought to infiltrate, transactional firms tended to receive concrete feedback on specific features and ended up optimizing for one client without commitment rather than for the broader needs of the market.
Confirmatory Search. Entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search (9 out of 28) spanned all sub-sectors of digital health and varied based on funds raised and revenue generated prior to the accelerator program. Firms engaged in confirmatory search interacted with a broad set of stakeholders, seeking validation of their innovations and their plans for market expansion rather than just initiating deals with customers. For example, DEVICEPACK sought interactions with hospital CIOs to validate that their decision to integration with the FHIR standard was the right one, rather than directly elicit a deal. Firms engaged in confirmatory search did not tend to initiate deals right away, but instead searched broadly to gather information that would enhance the efficacy of their innovations. Thus, these entrepreneurs received more feedback and more varied types of feedback than transactional searchers but were selective in how they responded to feedback. Table 2b illustrates how CONTENTVR, a firm using virtual reality to improve the life experiences of the homebound and the elderly in managed care facilities, engaged in and learned from market search.
Insert Table 2b
Market Search. While transactional searchers like PACK relied on a narrow set of customer contacts, confirmatory searchers deliberately engaged in broad search from diverse sources to validate their assumptions about the market. For example, SENSOR was interested in launching a pilot with a pharmaceutical company to validate how their product might be used to support new drug testing. Before negotiating with a pharmaceutical company on a potential deal, SENSOR engaged broadly with cohort peers, the ALPHA team, and experts in clinical trials and pharmaceutical testing to confirm they had formulated the plan for their trial appropriately. The CEO shared, "I have a very good idea, of what the study will be, but, first I want to test my hypotheses. Then I want to find out how much it will cost and whether [a pharmaceutical company] is willing to pay for it." Broad search delayed confirmatory searchers from initiating deals with customers by approximately two months compared with firms engaged in transactional search.
What drove entrepreneurial firms' confirmatory search was the quest to gain affirmation of their innovation approach. As the founders of NUDGE, a firm focused on opioid addiction patient recovery, explained, "We wanted to figure out how we might expand upon not just improving drug rehabilitation rates which is huge, but how we might package the data we already collect and already analyze, for drug companies or hospitals to better inform rehab planning." The founders of NUDGE engaged with a myriad of external stakeholders, even those who could not make deals, such as a retired insurance executive. This retired executive was wary about how NUDGE might demonstrate sustained adoption of their patient recovery mobile application: "He is nervous that addicts might lose their phones often, which is totally a belief of his and not scientifically proven. We know the stats on this and he is just wrong." NUDGE founders continued to seek alternative perspectives on whether "opioid addicts" could be effectively serviced with a mobile application. During the next two weeks, NUDGE founders attempted to confirm the validity of the issues this retired executive raised by querying the Alpha program director and other cohort members. "We wanted to know what this guy was really like? Did he actually know anything?" Everyone thought the executive was "solid, a good guy, smart, knowledgeable."
This broader search helped Nudge triangulate on the validity of issues that threatened the potential efficacy and relevance of their innovation before revising their product or their market assumptions.
Learning Behavior. Unlike transactional searchers that mainly received concrete feedback, entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search received both ambiguous and concrete feedback.
Whereas concrete feedback offered a solution to an issue, ambiguous feedback raised new issues with no clear cut solution. For example, a prominent hospital executive recounted the feedback they gave to SENSOR: "they were really interested in understanding how their product could help us solve our strategic priorities. We had some ideas. But also, we told them we weren't totally sure. We hadn't figured out how to solve all of those issues yet, so there were opportunities to really help."
Entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search sought feedback from a broad village but made a conscious decision to avoid "stuff that is vague" to maintain their current plan and save time. For example, the hospital executive above had signaled to SENSOR that "there were opportunities to really help" and they were open to collaborating on new ideas that furthered their strategic priorities, but SENSOR did not pick up on this. Instead, SENSOR focused on the hospital's minor request to add functionality to their device. DEVICEPACK explained the logic of this search behavior and recommended focusing "on the things the customer makes clear. And try to avoid stuff that is vague and they [customers] really haven't made up their minds about. If you focus on the unclear stuff it can really put you at risk for looking like you don't understand their needs. And well, it takes time sorting out what it is they want." Entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search primarily ignored ambiguous feedback and, as shown in Table 2b , enacted two practices to process concrete feedback: recognizing and reframing.
Confirmatory searchers conducted broader search than transactional searchers and thus obtained different kinds of feedback to help them recognize rather minimize the feedback they received. They were able to apply what they learned from scanning the environment (e.g. Gavetti & Leventhal, 2000) rather than just what they had gathered through engagement with select customers. For example, when NUDGE engaged a hospital executive about conducting a clinical pilot, he shared the same concerns about mobile phone usage, noted by other stakeholders. The founders of NUDGE recognized this feedback: "they think we need to add some in-person tracking process and adjust the way we technically track adherence. We know they think that. We heard it before". In response to this feedback, the founders of NUDGE reframed the market for their innovation: If early stage opioid patients were not reliable phone owners, then they would focus their application on patients in later stages of recovery, where phone ownership would be less problematic. By reframing the relevant use case, entrepreneurial firms appeared attentive to feedback without revisiting underlying product assumptions. NUDGE hoped to convince the hospital that their requests to add in person tracking were not necessary. The problem with their reframing efforts was that the market for late stage recovery was much smaller than the market for all stages of recovery. In the end, reframing was not effective as this hospital was not interested in buying NUDGE's application without the requested revision to add "in person tracking" in the application.
Entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search, searched broadly to foster accurate search rather than efficient search. But when their search uncovered ambiguous information that could enhance the market relevance of their innovations, these entrepreneurial firms did not choose to learn from this type of feedback. These entrepreneurial firms selectively learned from feedback only when they could immediately understand its relevancy, otherwise they ignored it. Unlike entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search, who ended up doing endless revisions to satisfy custom requirements, confirmatory searchers tried to reframe the market scope of their product without revisiting their product's core assumptions. Both NUDGE and DEVICEPACK selectively adapted to the feedback gained from search (Edmondson, 1999) They limited their learning and the ability of their partners to learn by ignoring "vague stuff" that external stakeholders were willing to share but that was not viewed as actionable.
Ultimately confirmatory searchers were able to grow their customer pipeline and revise their existing customer use-cases but these revisions did not develop new customer markets or support the growth of new streams of revenue. In most cases, when entrepreneurs reframed the market scope of their innovations, it decreased rather than increased the market scope of their innovation and this was not persuasive to external stakeholders.
Diagnostic Search. Ten out of 28 entrepreneurial firms from all sub-sectors of digital health that varied in the funds raised and revenue generated at the start of the study pursued diagnostic market search. Like entrepreneurial firms conducting confirmatory search, diagnostic searchers interacted with a broad set of cohort peers, experts, and customers. As shown in Table 2c , unlike entrepreneurial firms conducting confirmatory search, diagnostic searchers sought joint problem solving by engaging with stakeholders on unresolved issues without necessarily seeking confirmation for their ideas.
Entrepreneurial firms engaged in diagnostic search engaged with ambiguous feedback and were unafraid of surfacing issues that might require substantive underlying changes to their innovations. These entrepreneurial firms were willing to revisit the assumptions underlying their innovations and identify new possibilities with their innovations rather than just revise their existing product like transactional searchers or reframe their market scope like confirmatory searchers.
Insert Table 2c Diagnostic searchers were willing to approach search in ways transactional or confirmatory When diagnostic searchers confronted ambiguity, they translated the "vague stuff" that confirmatory searchers avoided into feedback that could be actionable. For example, a nationally renowned hospital gave INSTRUCT feedback that their digital pre-operative instruction application was "too narrow". INSTRUCT founders did not know how to make sense of this. "Narrow" could refer to their venture's feature set, the comprehensiveness of the pre-operative instructions they offered or the range of procedures covered. Based on this feedback, the founders of INSTRUCT designed a collaborative workshop with hospital executives to learn where the hospital's true issues lay. By doing so, INSTRUCT learned that they were concerned with not only pre-operative but also post-operative patient education. With this additional effort, INSTRUCT was able to translate ambiguous feedback in a way that identified new possibilities and broadened the use case and thus the market scope of their innovationfrom pre-operative instructions to also post-operative instructions. One of the founders shared: "What we do for this procedure could easily be applied to other areas." Diagnostic searchers were not immune from receiving concrete feedback that could send them into a spiral of custom iteration, but they handled it differently than other entrepreneurs in our study. When entrepreneurs redirected stakeholders' focus, they engaged with ambiguity, but exerted leadership over the collaboration in a way that convinced external stakeholders to focus on areas that would not only solve their own problem but also improve an entrepreneurial firm's market scope. This was a powerful practice for entrepreneurial firms that lacked resources to assert control over the cost of revisions needed to integrate new digital technologies into established institutions. For example, when INSTRUCT began collaborating with hospital staff on post-operative procedures, INSTRUCT identified inconsistencies in the measurement of compliance that spanned hospital departments and became valued internally for their expertise. They were then able to apply this expertise to other health systems moving forward. In this manner, INSTRUCT learned more about the hospital's operating environment and how they could add value to the hospital's problem while growing the market scope for their innovation.
Diagnostic searchers differed from their counterparts in their embrace of the ambiguities associated with digital health and their ability to convince the stakeholders they interacted with to join them on a journey into the unknown. They not only were unafraid of taming and translating ambiguity but were willing to revisit the assumptions that underpinned their innovation. In collaboratively identifying new possibilities, they enabled joint learning about their customers' environments while avoiding costly iterations on their existing product and redirecting stakeholder focus in ways that expanded rather than narrowed market scope.
Variation in New Venture Development
As seen in Table 3 , all entrepreneurial firms made some form of progress developing their ventures. We tracked three types of progress: growing a customer pipeline, narrowing or expanding market scope and growing revenue. First, all 28 firms grew their pipeline of potential customers interested in digital health innovation. Identifying paying customers was a market challenge for all firms studied and cultivating stakeholders interested in digital health was a first step toward addressing this challenge. We also consider this a sign of venture development progress as entrepreneurial firms with vetted networks are well positioned to achieve longer term entrepreneurial outcomes (Hallen, 2008; Cohen et al, 2018) .
INSERT TABLE 3
However, the entrepreneurial firms we studied varied as to whether they narrowed or broadened their market scope or grew new sources of revenue. Nine entrepreneurial firms engaged in transactional search grew their pipeline, but did not change their market scope or grow revenue. Nine entrepreneurial firms engaged in confirmatory search grew their pipeline but reframed the relevancy of their innovations in ways that narrowed their market scope. Only the ten entrepreneurial firms engaged in diagnostic search grew their customer pipeline, expanded their market scope and grew new streams of revenue during the time of study. Growing new sources of revenue involved closing a deal with a paying customer and was a significant signal of venture development progress. These three types of new venture development progress were likely accumulative as we did not have any cases of entrepreneurs growing new revenue without also building a pipeline and expanding their market scope.
Theoretical Model: Market Search and New Venture Development
Our data revealed that market search consists of two dimensions: search and learning.
Entrepreneurial firms varied in how they approached market search along these dimensions and based on this variance, we identified three different types of market search. Figure 3 maps the relationship between these three types of search and different types of venture development progress. Relying on these configurations, we induct a grounded explanation of how varying types of market search can influence new venture development.
Insert Figure 3 When entrepreneurial firms engage in transactional market search, they seek efficient exchange, yet this can be counterproductive to progressing venture development as data intake is truncated.
Entrepreneurial firms conducting transactional market search seek exchange and engage solely with select customers to accelerate deal making. This narrow, exchanging seeking approach limits the input entrepreneurs receive to specific, concrete feedback offered by customers seeking solutions for their own unique operating environments. These tailored customer requests inform entrepreneurial firms of "local" requirements for their innovations but do not provide entrepreneurial firms with insight into the broader market needs. Entrepreneurial firms conducting transactional market search will try to either minimize or deflect feedback in the hopes of signing deals without making costly iterations to their innovations. However, most end up acquiescing to custom, one-off customer requests and sub-optimally revising the technology underpinning their innovations. These entrepreneurial firms will grow their customer pipeline, but will not make progress expanding their market scope or growing revenue.
When entrepreneurial firms engage in confirmatory market search, they seek validation of their innovations and search broadly, but selectively learn from the products of search. They receive a bevy of both concrete and ambiguous feedback that informs them of broader market needs, but they only integrate and learn from concrete feedback that they recognize and understand how to apply. Rather than rethink the assumptions underlying their innovations, entrepreneurial firms that engage in confirmatory search are more likely to reframe the market scope for their innovation without making substantive changes to the underlying innovation. When engaged in confirmatory search, entrepreneurs will grow their customer pipeline but if they only acquiesce to feedback without exploring it may make adaptations that narrow their market scope.
When entrepreneurial firms engage in diagnostic market search, they search broadly seeking to surface issues and engage in joint problem solving with potential customers. If these entrepreneurs can tame ambiguity and translate feedback to identify new possibilities and redirect stakeholder learning, they will make progress on all dimensions of venture development. Although confirmatory search offers a breadth of feedback, what distinguishes diagnostic market search is an approach of discovery and mutual learning to problem solve and a willingness to engage and leverage ambiguity. Entrepreneurial firms that engage in diagnostic search will create opportunities to collaboratively explore new solution spaces with external stakeholders in ways that leverage their existing innovation investment. This difference in market search approach and learning behaviors helps explain why entrepreneurial firms were more likely to make more progress developing their ventures.
DISCUSSION
Entrepreneurship and New Venture Development. Despite the notion that entrepreneurial firms develop deep understandings of the market prior to entry (e.g., Nerkar & Roberts, 2004) , all entrepreneurs in our study leveraged external stakeholders to conduct market search after launching their innovations.
Although Pontikes and Barnett (2018) articulate the need for market search, little research examines the actual process of market search which is difficult to study without a field based approach Van de Ven & Poole, 2017 , This is a critical stage particularly for under resourced entrepreneurs, for at this stage, entrepreneurial firms have already heavily invested in developing their innovations and are expecting to shift from developing their innovations to earning revenue. Market search incurs two costs that are difficult for entrepreneurial firms to absorb (e.g. Stinchcombe, 1965) . First, there is the cost of the time needed to engage in market search as well as the opportunity cost of time away from other aspects of new venture development. Second, there is the cost of processing, responding to or acting upon what is learned from market search. When new information is gained from market search, entrepreneurs need to make sense of it and assess what is required to adapt new innovations to meet market needs. Although the first cost is well acknowledged in the literature (Piezunka & Dahlander, 2015) , the second cost is less explored.
Prior research shows that young entrepreneurial firms tend to "satisfice" prematurely and may benefit from "reigniting search for problems that they already view as solved" (Cohen et al, 2018 ). Yet little research has examined if and how entrepreneurial firms learn from the feedback gained from search.
Organizations like accelerators (Amezcua, Grimes, Bradley & Wiklund, 2013) can help combat the bounded rationality that may trigger premature satisficing by embeddding entrepreneurial firms in "information-rich environments"; convening a set of experts and mentors and creating standardized programs that offer consultative resources (Packalen, Siedel and O'Mahony 2016, Cohen, 2013; Cohen et al, 2018 ). Yet, little research has examined how entrepreneurial firms vary in the way they make use of those resources. Even though the entrepreneurial firms in our study were at a common stage of maturity and focused on a common field, we uncover significant variation in how market search was conducted.
Despite the opportunity to observe other firms' search processes in their cohort, we did not observe entrepreneurial firms changing their approach to market search during the time of study. This suggests that access to a common village of resources is insufficient for making progress on new venture development.
While much research has examined the factors that predict late stage outcomes such as acquisitions (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; exits Market Search and Innovation. Although theories of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 2000) and bounded rationality (Simon, 1972; 1979; Hallen & Pahnke, 2016; Cohen et al, 2018) would suggest that entrepreneurial firms have natural limits to their ability to absorb information from external sources, the differences in search approach that we identified were intentional and deliberative. The entrepreneurial firms we observed varied in the degree to which they valued efficiency over accuracy; the degree to which they were willing to open the hood on their innovations and revisit prior assumptions; and in the degree to which they were willing to appear vulnerable confronting ambiguity in front of external stakeholders. These differences were reflected in what entrepreneurial firms sought from search, which subsequently shaped the information gleaned from search and interactions with external stakeholders. Thus, the limits of entrepreneurial firms' ability to process what was learned from search was not solely defined by their absorptive capacity or bounded rationality, but the intentionality or approach that initiated their search.
Scholars suggest that as an innovation moves from idea generation to development and elaboration stages, broad search should dissipate in favor of select strong ties to foster translation and collaboration (Carlile, 2003) ; positive feedback, (Perry-Smith & Mannucci 2017) and convergent thinking, (Flemming, Mingo & Chen, 2010) . We studied entrepreneurial firms in the later stages of innovation: they had all launched viable innovations and were striving to gain market traction. Yet, we found that when entrepreneurial firms' search breadth was narrow, they were less likely to make progress on venture development than when they searched broadly. Prior research (Katila & Ahuja, 2002) typically focuses on incumbent firms that benefit from a host of internal knowledge sources and might not need to engage in broad external search to implement new innovations. Political and hierarchical structures might constrain or complicate broad search in the later stages of developing an innovation (Allen, 1977) . The entrepreneurial firms in our study neither benefited from nor were they constrained by these conditions and were encouraged by the accelerator in which they were embedded to search broadly to foster adoption of their digital innovations. Yet, not all heeded this advice. In our context, narrow search was a false promise of efficiency, as narrow approaches to market search limited the feedback entrepreneurial firms could receive about the broader market context, inhibiting their ability to engage in joint problem solving with potential customers.
Learning. When entrepreneurial firms conduct market search, we expect them to update their prior understanding of market dynamics, through a process of on-going learning (Chen et al, 2018) .
Scholarship has tended to focus on one of two aspects of learning: the sources of learning, be they direct or indirect, (Davis & Bingham, 2012; Fiol, 1994; Simon, 1991) ; or the collective learning behaviors used to process and respond to new information (Edmondson, 1999; 2001; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992; Rerup, 2009) . While scholars have treated these two aspects of learning independently, our approach considers how both aspects of learning work together so we can distinguish search behaviors from learning behaviors. By assessing both aspects of learning, we can explore whether firms suffer from a failure to surface relevant information during search or from a failure to make sense of the new information produced from search. Otherwise, poor search behavior can be mistaken for poor learning behavior and mask the appropriate way to redress each problem.
In our context, when entrepreneurial firms approached market search focused on exchange and engaged narrowly with customers, they limited the type of feedback they received and minimized or deflected the feedback gained. Entrepreneurial firms seeking confirmation of their innovations were adept at broad search, but less likely to dig deep and process ambiguous feedback that was not immediately understandable. Only diagnostic searchers were able to both search broadly and engage with the ambiguity search could produce. Without this distinction between search and learning behaviors, the difference between confirmatory and diagnostic search patterns would be masked. This distinction offers new avenues to explain why some firms are more likely to learn than others: they may not have searched broadly enough to procure the comprehensive feedback needed to prompt learning behaviors. We contribute an explanation of how both search and learning together inform how entrepreneurial firms make progress on new venture development.
By taming ambiguity and directing attention to unexplored areas where both parties could learn, entrepreneurial firms were able to foster mutual learning with potential customers and jointly identify new spaces for innovation. When organizations are given the opportunity to learn, they often are more willing to commit resources for a period of mutual discovery and development (Hamel, 1991) . This may help explain why diagnostic searchers were able to garner revenue commitments from large incumbent firms, when other entrepreneurial firms in our study failed to do so. When customers expressed ambiguous feedback entrepreneurial firms that took the lead and redirected the search and learning path to their own form and purpose were able to forge revenue generating customer relationships. 
